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Starting with Chile in the early 1980s, Latin American countries have pushed telecommunications reform to
create regulatory environments that encourage private investment, especially foreign investment. I look at regulatory
trends in telecommunications in 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries during 1980-97 and construct an
index based on the following aspects: autonomy, accountability, clarity of  roles and objectives, transparency and
participation, and the type of  legal mandate that creates a regulatory body. The index shows clearly that, in
general, most countries embraced strong regulatory reforms along the lines recommended by experts and practitio-
ners. The index also correlates well with main political, risk, economic and telecommunications variables.
Key words: Telecommunications, regulation, regulatory governance and privatization.
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RESUMEN
Empezando con Chile a comienzos de 1980, los países de América Latina han profundizado la reforma a las
telecomunicaciones para crear un entorno regulatorio que incentive la inversión privada, en particular la inversión
extranjera. En este artículo, trabajo las tendencias regulatorias en el sector telecomunicaciones de 24 países
latinoamericanos y del caribe durante el período 1980-1997 y construyo un índice basado en : autonomía, rendición
de cuentas, claridad de las funciones y objetivos, transparencia y participación, y el tipo de mandato legal que crea
el ente regulador. El índice muestra que, en promedio, la mayoría de los países llevaron a cabo fuertes reformas
regulatorias en la dirección sugerida por expertos e investigadores. El índice también se correlación bien con varias
variables políticas, de riesgo, económicas y de telecomunicaciones.
Palabras clave: telecomunicaciones, regulación, gobierno regulatorio, privatización.
 Clasificación JEL: L5, L9
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, economists have given more attention to institutional factors as part
of the explanation for differences in countries’ economic development. Institutional economics
has a long tradition, but it has been formally incorporated into theoretical economic models and
empirical research only recently.1
Although some analyses of how the institutional environment affects economic growth have
been done using sources like the Polity III index, the Gastil Liberty index and indexes developed
by specialized country-risk agencies, like ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) no study has
undertook any effort to construct an index trying to encompass the main aspect a regulatory
body should have.2 I examine the theoretical aspects that a regulatory framework for telecom-
munications should encompass and report the first estimates of a regulatory framework index.
As the world economy becomes more integrated, recognition of the need for expanded and
modernized telecommunications services has pervaded the plans and policies of most Latin
American countries (Hudson 1997). Telecommunications reform has been implemented in al-
most all the countries in the region, although the degree or depth of reform has been different
across countries (Gutierrez 2000).
In this study, I look at trends in the telecommunications regulatory governance in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Efforts to build a sound regulatory environment for the telecom-
munications sector have been fruitful. The regulatory framework index presented in Section 4
shows that almost all countries studied have progressed considerably in this area. The next
section gives a general overview for a sample of Latin American countries, including the condi-
tion of polity in the region before and during regulatory reform.
2. CONTEXT OF LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM
In the 1980s the debt crisis that hit almost all Latin American countries brought lower or nega-
tive economic growth rates, an increase in poverty, a broader gap in the distribution of income, and
higher levels of unemployment. To cope with these problems, in the mid-1980s, international
organizations like the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded that governments in the region undertake broad reforms.
Some called this set of structural policies the “Washington Consensus” (see Williamson 1990).
Although countries embarked on telecommunications reform at different times, it is clear
that overall economic conditions were not ideal. Low annual growth rates suggested a low de-
mand for telecommunications, but the region continued its integration with the world economy
(see Table 1). Furthermore, greater levels of urbanization in the region reduced the cost of
deploying telecom networks.
1 Specifically, see the collection of articles in Alston et al. (1996).
2 The closest study might be Henisz and Zelner (2001) who used an index of political constraints. Growth
models have made extensive use of institutional and political factors. See Barro (1996), Knack and Keefer
(1995), and Keefer and Knack (1997) among others. Recently, the World Bank has used the ICRG index to
measure institutional developments in Latin America; see Burki and Perry (1998) for details.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 5
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Williamson (1998) states that the new institutional economics has two dimensions. The macro
level consists of formal and informal rules (customs, constitutions, laws, etc.), while the micro
level deals with the institutions of governance referred to as polity. Despite poor economic
performance, the region was a winner at the macro level of polity and in the way international
analysts perceived the region. The well-known indexes ICRG and Institutional Investor, which re-
flect external analysts’ view of the institutional factors affecting the region, show increases that
range from 11 to 29.4 percent when comparing the second half of the 1980s with the first half
of the 1990s. The region, then, progressed remarkably in this regard. Recently an index of
political constraints that involve checks and balances for government powers (executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial) also shows that the region has enhanced its political dimensions. The index
called POLCON went from .299 in the late part of 1980s to .376 in the second half of the 1990s.
TABLE 1
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS FOR LATIN AMERICA
Demand and Cost Indicators 
Indicators (number of countries in 
parentheses) 
1986-90  1991-95  1996-97 
GDP per capita (US$1995) (24)  2,493  2,662  2,858 
 Annual growth rate of GDP per capita  1.25  1.65  3.46 
 Structural Policy Index (20)  .425  .581  NA 
 General Reform Index (17)  .614  .788  NA 
 URBAN (24)  60.28  62.79  63.12 
Political and Risk Indices 
 Democracy-GOVTYPE (21)  1.40  1.93  2.10 
 Gastil-Political Rights (22)  0.69  0.73  0.75 
 Gastil-Civil Rights (22)  0.67  0.69  0.70 
 Institutional InvestorΒ /(20)  21.26 25.78  32.38 
 ICRG (22)  21.69  28.24  30.98 
 Economic Freedom Index (19)  4.79  5.55  7.00 
 POLCON (21)  .299  .328  .376 
Telecommunications Indicators 
 Telecommunications Regulatory  0.29  0.43  0.75 
 Cellular subscribers per 100  0.01  0.31  1.14 
 Main lines per 100 inhabitants*/ (24)  6.2  8.9  11.4 
 
Note: The countries in the samples are Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The variables are described in
the Appendix.
Other important indicators are related to the political headway Latin America has made in the
last fifteen years. The Govtype index shows political stability or level of democratization. As6 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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shown in Table 1, in the first half of the 1990s, the governments of the region leaned toward
more democratic processes reflecting a broader social consensus. The two Gastil indexes for
political and civil rights also show a slight increase for more open and democratic societies in the
region. The Economic Freedom Index, which judges economies’ degree of openness, reflects
how the region as a whole became more integrated in world markets.
In the telecommunications sector, the region as a whole achieved good results. Progress is
apparent in both mobile and fixed telephony. The indicator of main phone lines per 100 inhab-
itants (or teledensity) increased from six to almost nine lines. Although this is still far below the
level of developed countries, Latin America’s rate is now twice that of Asia’s (5.1 teledensity
when Japan is excluded) and about five times the African average of teledensity (2.0 in 1997).
More recently (1996-97), the performance of the above indicators has kept improving. An
important demand factor for main phone lines is GDP per capita, which has increased regionally
by almost 3.5 percent (annual rate). In addition, the ICRG and Institutional Investors indicators in-
creased between 9.9 and 24.5 percent compared to the first half of 1990s. The telecommunications
indicators increased greatly, especially the total number of cellular phones per 100 inhabitants.
Yet, overall progress in the region has been mixed. Economic and financial developments
that followed the Mexican crisis of 1995 and Brazil’s of 1998 threaten and blur the future of the
region. Many factors keep Latin America’s expectations low. According to Stiglitz (1998, 1), a
leading world economist, “That [Washington] consensus ... focused on privatization, but paid
too little attention to the institutional infrastructure that is required to make markets work, and
especially to the importance of competition.”
3. THE BUILDING OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Why regulate the telecommunications sector? Many cite market-failure arguments. From the
point of view of the positive political economy, the telecommunications sector is (was) a natural
monopoly, so only a few operators can provide telecommunications service profitably at lower
cost. However, this gives rise to a privileged situation, and dead-weight loss will appear if the
market is left unregulated. Thus, regulation is justified.
A second explanation involves imperfect or asymmetric information regarding service qual-
ity, technologies that may not be easily compatible, and so on. Regulation is said to improve the
social outcome because regulators can supply information about a provider’s service quality and
force the provider to maintain a given minimum level of quality. Also, the regulator may set some
technological standards for compatibility, improving the well-being of the society.
A third justification for regulation involves the public good and external effects. The use of
the electromagnetic spectrum is controlled because, if left unregulated, people or operators will
use them freely, interfering with each other’s transmission and making communications impos-
sible. From a normative approach it is said that government should regulate because telecommu-
nications services are a necessary good. Pricing and subsidy policies help countries achieve the
goal of universal service by optimizing the social deployment of networks.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 7
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Without going into the details of the politics of regulation, it suffices to say that most of
these arguments have been questioned. This has led some developed countries (e.g., New Zealand)
to abolish regulatory institutions. In Australia, the functions of telecom regulators have been
partially absorbed by competition commissions. Paradoxically, while this kind of questioning is
growing in developed countries, the opposite trend is on the rise in developing countries, largely
because institutions like the World Bank and IDB keep urging the creation and strengthening of
regulatory bodies.
3.1. DESIGN OF REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
Economists have been aware of characteristics common to natural monopolies in public
utilities since at least 1902 when Farrer (quoted in Newbery 1999, 28), anticipating the basics for
regulatory involvement, mentions “economies of scales, capital intensity, nonstorability with
fluctuating demand, locational specificity generating location rents, producing necessities or es-
sential for the community and involving direct connections to customers.” Levy and Spiller
(1994) summarize the conjunction of these characteristics as follows. First, the technologies
have important economies of scale and scope. Second, most of a utility’s assets are highly spe-
cific and non-redeployable in other activities without great costs. Third, the services provided
are considered necessary goods. Altogether, these three characteristics undercut the ability of
ordinary market mechanisms to deliver first-best performance.
The first characteristic means there will likely be only a few providers of telecom services.
Therefore, governments cannot rely on competitive markets to prevent the abuse of market
power. The second characteristic implies that a large proportion of the investment (fixed) can be
considered as sunk, giving governments the incentive to behave opportunistically once invest-
ment is undertaken. In the extreme case, government can take over the operation of the firm.
More likely, government may expropriate value administratively by setting prices below their
long-run average incremental costs or by imposing some specific technical conditions concern-
ing the purchase of equipment, labor contracts and so on. Operators in that situation have few
options. They will prefer to stay in the market to the extent their operating returns exceed their
return from shutting down and deploying their assets elsewhere.
The third characteristic signals the fact that the pricing of utility services is likely to be very
political. As Levy and Spiller (1994, 204) state, “The combination of significant investment in
durable, specific assets with the high level of politicization of utilities has the following result:
utilities are highly vulnerable to administrative expropriation of their vast quasi-rents.” These
points partially explain the perceived need for an administrative agency insulated from undue
political pressures.
Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996) look at regulation as a design mechanism with two dimen-
sions: governance and incentives. For them, regulatory governance involves the creation of a
transparent and predictable regulatory system that can be sustained over time for utilities in
different sectors. Regulatory incentives are the mechanisms that pertain to pricing, subsidies and
other operating policies. I consider regulatory governance as the key element in the creation of a
regulatory framework for telecommunications. Regulatory incentives improve sector performance
only if there is strong regulatory governance.8 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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Regulatory governance is determined basically by a country’s institutional endowment. In
countries with strong regulatory governance, well-known checks and balances limit executive dis-
cretionary power. The stronger the regulatory governance, the stronger the constraints on execu-
tive and legislative discretion. For the telecommunications sector, the existence of a specific regulatory
framework is important for sector development.3 Although private investors look at the overall
regulatory governance in a country, in developing countries they also look at whether there is a
specialized regulatory authority that credibly safeguards the workings of the specific sector of interest.
The attributes to be taken into account when creating a regulatory framework involve
theoretical and practical considerations. These are documented below to provide the rationale
for a regulatory index developed later.
3.2. APPROACHES TO THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Practitioners have long recognized the need for regulatory bodies for utility sectors4 and
have stipulated some attributes that such regulatory bodies should have. I use their work in
constructing a regulatory framework index for telecommunications.
The regulatory framework can be thought of as two parts: structure and process. Structure
includes the distribution of regulatory tasks among different levels of the government, the objec-
tives and empowerment given to each agency and the procedures for choosing the regulatory
agents. Process includes the mechanisms for communication governing the potentially overlapping
functions among different levels of the government, the ways to overcome conflict and the length
and span of control of different regulatory bodies. As Stern (1997, 72) points out, the arguments
for an independent regulatory agency may be more compelling for “economies with slow growth
in demand for utility investment and/or macroeconomic credibility with high indebtedness.”
In the initial design of the regulatory body, structure should matter more than process.
According to Stern (1994) and Stern and Holder (1999), the main features of a regulatory body
should be: autonomy, accountability, clarity of roles and objectives, transparency and participa-
tion. The first three aspects relate to the structure of the regulatory framework, the last two
relate to process.
3.2.1. AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE
Concerning degree of independence/autonomy, ITU (1993) notes three distinct dimensions
that may be temporally linked or not.
1) independence from operational activities (i.e., the regulatory body is separate from the agency
or unit that provides the telecommunications services),
3 The focus of this paper and the index is on basic telecommunications services, but future regulatory frame-
work indexes must include all kinds of telecommunications services, like the valued-added services, mobile
telephony and Internet.
4 “Regulatory body” is defined as the individual, board or administrative agency making decisions on regulatory
matters. See ITU (1993), Tyler and Bednarczyk (1993), Miller (1994), Schultz (1994), Townsend (1994), Sinha
(1995), Tenenbaum (1996), Cave (1997), Melody (1997b), Stern and Holder (1999), Noll (1999), and Kennard
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2) independence from interested parties, such as industrial customers,
3) degree of independence from the executive branch of the government, which sets broad
policy for the sector.
Some Latin American countries  —Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, for instance—
undertook the first regulatory separation in the 1980s. This first step is the first element in the
regulatory framework index. In Latin America, regulatory responsibility was usually given to a
unit within the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Although regulators were still subject
to daily political interference and executive discretion, it was a beginning and significant because
regulation by the agency associated with the operating telecom activities cannot be impartial.
Another potential benefit from separation of operation and regulation is a separate body of
bureaucracy more specialized in regulatory matters. Such a bureaucracy might be more willing to
back up the privatization process or promote further liberalization, given an understanding of
the sector and the fact that status and salary are no longer linked to operations. Although this
dimension of independence has been neglected in most analysis, the chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has said, “The defining feature of an independent regula-
tory body is that the regulator is separate from, and not accountable to, any provider of telecom-
munications services. To ensure that the regulator is, in fact, impartial, the regulatory body and
its staff should not have a direct or indirect financial interest in any of the entities being regu-
lated. Inevitable conflicts of interest arise when government controls both the regulatory agency
and the dominant players in the market” (Kennard 1999, I-2).
The organizational structure for telecom regulation takes different forms depending on the
overall regulatory governance and polity present in a country. In general, the following three
forms are of interest for Latin American telecommunications:
1) A regulatory authority within the government ministry responsible for telecommunications,
as in Chile, France, Germany and some Asian countries,
2) A fully autonomous regulatory body empowered to make decisions not subject to review by
ministers, such as the FCC in the United States,
3) A semi-autonomous regulatory agency whose decisions are generally autonomous but some-
times subject to review by ministers, as is common in Latin America.5
Degree of independence is an arguable aspect.6 To understand independence, we can use the
FCC as a benchmark. Although courts may challenge its decisions, it is a fully autonomous
regulatory body empowered to make decisions not subject to review by any secretary or the
executive branch. However, such a regulatory body may be impossible for any Latin American
country. As Melody (1997a, 198) states, “An FCC-type independent regulatory agency is a unique
5 I use semi-independent in a broad sense that may be highly controversial. Tenenbaum (1996, 32) states that
“what people really mean by an independent regulator entity is a government entity that does not have to get
the approval of the prime minister or other high-level political authorities to raise (or lower) tariffs,” but this
definition may be too restrictive.
6 For details regarding factors that may favor or discourage the three types of independence, see ITU (1993)
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product of the US constitutional system, with its elaborate division of powers among executive,
legislative and judicial branches of governments. Some analysts view the public utility regulatory
agencies in the US, including the FCC, as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial organizations. They
have broad mandates and significant freedom both to interpret and to enforce their mandates.
Few countries have governmental structures that have permitted such a degree of indepen-
dence, at least so far. Some even view such degree of  independence as an abdication of  the political responsibil-
ity of  elected officials [italics added].”
Some countries have kept their regulatory body within a particular ministry (Chile, Barbados,
Belize and Uruguay), while countries like Suriname have not taken even the first step toward
separating the regulatory authority from operational activities. Some countries have established a
telecommunications regulatory agency (Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru,
Paraguay and Venezuela) while others have a non-specialized regulatory body (Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Panama). The legislation backing up the level of regulatory author-
ity varies. Some countries have opted for specific laws, while others have enacted decrees.
TABLE 2
TYPE OF TELECOM REGULATORY AGENCY
Country  Name of Agency  Year of*/ 
Creation  Created by 





Executive Decree 1185/90; 
Decree 80/97; 
Barbados  Public Utility Board  1978  Public Utility Act 
Belize Office  of 
Telecommunications 
1991 NA 
Bolivia Superintendencia  de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1994  Law 1600 of 1994 
Brazil Agencia  Nacional  de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1997  Law 9.472/97 and Decree 
2338/97 
Chile Subsecretaria  de 
Comunicaciones 
1977- Decree-Law  1762/77 




Decree 2122/92 and Law 
142/94 
Costa Rica  Autoridad Reguladora de 
Servicios Publicos 
1996 Law  7593/96 
Ecuador  Comision Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 






Special Law of 
Telecommunications 
- Reformation Law to the 
Law of 
Telecommunications 
El Salvador  Superintendencia General de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1996 Decree  142/97  or 
Telecommunications Law 
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Country  Name of Agency  Year of*/ 
Creation  Created by 
Guatemala Superintendencia  de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1996 Decree  94/97 
Guyana  Public Utility Commission  1990  Public Utility Commission 
Act 
Honduras  Comision Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1995 Decree  185/95 
Jamaica  Office of Utilities Regulation  1995  Office of Utility Regulation 
Act. Amended in 2000 
Mexico  Comision Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1996 Presidential  Decree 
Nicaragua Instituto  Nicaraguense  de 
Telecomunicaciones y 
Correos 
1995 Law  200/95 
Panama  Ente Regulador de los 
Servicios Pδ blicos 
1997 Executive  Decree  73/97 
Paraguay  Comision Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1995 Law  642/95 
Peru  Organismo Supervisor de la 




Supreme Decree 013/93 
Dominican Republic  Instituto Dominicano de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1998 Law  153/98 
Suriname Telesur  1980  Decree  C-38 
Trinidad & Tobago  Public Utility Commision  N.A.  N.A 
Uruguay  Administration Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1974 Decree-Law  14.235/74 
Venezuela  Comision Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones 
1991 Presidential  Decree 
1826/91 
  */ First year shows the year of creation; additional years date modifications that change or restructure the regu-
latory body.
Source: ITU (1998a,b), Lewington (1997), Harper (1997), Pyramid Research (1998) and legislation from the
countries.
3.2.2. ACCOUNTABILITY
According to Stern and Holder (1999, 38), the regulatory framework “should 1) ensure the
efficient provision of services to consumers at the minimum necessary prices and 2) support
private investment by continuing to allow companies the reasonable expectation of a normal
real rate of return.” But there are other players besides consumers and operators in the sector.
In terms of the organizational design approach, the legislative or the executive power is the
political principal. In reality, despite the fact that agencies are supposed to care for consumers’
welfare, regulators are not accountable directly to them, but to the legislative or executive power
and the operators within the sector.
Because regulators’ decisions can affect operators’ incentives and outcomes, decisions are
usually subject to challenge via some appeal mechanism. The existence of a mechanism to re-12 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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solve disputes between the regulatory body and operators or conflicts between operators is
called due process. Accountability is to the executive power in most Latin American countries.
The right of appeal should be limited to questions of regulatory process rather than concerned
with substantive policy issues. Finally, regulatory behavior (distinct from decisions) needs to be
accountable. Regulators can have incentives for wrongdoing, and there should be clear mecha-
nisms that limit or curb potential misbehavior.
Most countries in the sample have different levels of accountability, mostly entrusted in mecha-
nisms of appeal directly to the courts. For instance, Chile is recognized for its strong and inde-
pendent judiciary although it does not have an independent regulatory body. In Colombia, the
courts upheld local phone operators that appealed their right to enter long-distance service
markets, and the regulatory body was forced to open that market (in a restricted way).
3.2.3 CLARITY OF ROLES AND OBJECTIVES
In Latin America, a politically appointed minister of post and telecommunications usually
sets telecommunications policy. Recognizing that presidentialism7 dominates the politics of most
countries in the sample is important for analysis because the president can bargain with rival
political parties when making appointments to align the opposition with the presidential agenda.
In most Latin American countries, some regulatory roles are shared between the regulatory
body and other government agencies, particularly the ministry of telecommunications.8 This
may be viewed as a bad design of regulatory governance because of the potential overlapping of
tasks and the increased cost of separate agencies. However, this may have been the best decision,
given the relative market power and influence of the (new) telecom players. The separation of
responsibilities (roles) between different regulatory bodies acts as a mechanism to prevent (or
reduce) regulatory capture by the interest groups and to improve commitment (see Tirole 1994).
Furthermore, theoretical research suggests that when commitment by the government to the
regulatory contract is limited or when renegotiation is a likely outcome of the reform process,
separation of powers between different regulatory agencies is a better design (Spiller 1996).
From the point of view of practitioners, concerns about clarity of roles involve the following
questions. Does the legislation establish unambiguously which entity is responsible for what
regulatory functions? Are there functions carried out jointly between the regulator and the rel-
evant minister(s), or any that are ambiguous? Is it clear where the regulator has an advisory role
rather than a decision-making role?
Clarity of roles is important in the supervision of the dominant telecom operator. This has
been an important reason for creation of regulatory bodies. All Latin American countries have
had state telecom operators that were monopolies. After privatization and with the exclusivity
periods granted, the public monopolies became private monopolies. A regulatory body is needed
to curb the monopolistic incentive to exercise market power, impose high prices and reduce
7 See Mainwaring and Shugart (1997). “Presidentialism” refers to a political system dominated by the presi-
dency regardless of the majority party in the congress.
8 This multi-agency approach is also present in the United States where “several agencies of the federal govern-
ment, in addition to regulatory agencies of the fifty states, have important roles to play in the determination
of regulatory policy” (Kennard, 1999, II-1).LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 13
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consumers’ welfare.9 Concession contracts signed with new owners usually include many targets
in terms of coverage, quality, price schemes and so on. Without a doubt, oversight of targeted
goals is an important function of the regulatory body. In this respect, the regulatory body should
have the power to set tariffs for those markets where competition does not exist.
A further mission is assuring technical preconditions for effective operations. If competition
is to be allowed, this becomes crucial. There must be clarity regarding numbering plans, number
portability, technical standards or rules concerning interconnection. A related concern is effec-
tive management of common resources. This includes the allocation of the electromagnetic
spectrum, public rights of way and the design of clear mechanisms for allocating those rights. At
issue is who is responsible for policing the telecommunications sector, which turns out to be a
very important matter. Regulation will be credible if it bites. Thus, a regulatory body may have to
issue legally binding orders when it makes a decision (resolution) or when it concludes that an
operator is violating a regulatory norm. The recourses available to the regulatory authority if
legally binding decisions are persistently violated are also encompassed.
3.2.4. TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION
Practitioners argue that “regulators in developing countries are always under suspicion
because often their first big task is to lift prices up to costs” (Tenenbaum, 1996, 34; see also Stern
and Holder 1999, Tyler and Bednarczyk 1993, ITU 1993). The potential for collusion between
regulators and the regulated firms means that mechanisms for transparency need to be firmly
embedded in regulatory design. Three main aspects should be considered: (1) a clear specifica-
tion of the rules of the game, (2) opening up of the process to take or implement decisions and
(3) a mechanism to explain or publicize decisions. Notice that the better the transparency of the
regulatory process, the more accountability is imposed on the regulatory authority and the less
may be the likelihood of regulatory capture. According to Noll (1999, 44), “The agency can be
required to conduct all business in public, to refrain from secret contacts with either interested
parties or political officials and to release all relevant information pertaining to a decision as well
as a preliminary indication of the decision it is likely to make before the actual decision is made.”
(See also Smith and Wellenius 1998, 6).
3.3 LEGAL SCOPE OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
An important feature of regulatory governance in Latin America made explicit by Levy
and Spiller (1994, 1996) is the scope of the legislation creating the regulatory bodies and the
strength of the judiciary. Analysts emphasize this because many developing countries lack cred-
ibility in this regard.
Citing Bolivia, Borner et al. (1995, 19) point out that Supreme Decree No. 2247, issued in
1990, contains a series of measures aimed at encouraging private investment by domestic and
foreign entrepreneurs. It guarantees equal rights for foreign and domestic investors (Article 31),
9 As Pisciotta (1997, 339-40) states, “Most countries engaged in liberalisation commonly experience a need for
increased regulation. Licensing, enforcement of license obligations, rate rebalancing and review, interconnec-
tion rules, accounting standards and frequency allocation all normally require a significant degree of regula-
tory oversight - at least until fair competitive market rules are firmly established.”14 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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the same fiscal duties (Article 32) and respect of property (Article 33), no restriction on capital
transfers (Article 34) and continued convertibility of the boliviano (Article 35). From the point
of view of efficiency, the decree introduced the right policies. The question is whether these
policies are credible.
A presidential decree like Supreme Decree No. 2247 seems almost a paradox since a new
decree can rescind all former promises. The fact that an executive can implement rights simply
by issuing decrees shows that there are no mechanisms for guaranteeing property rights other
than the will of the executive. Hardly anything is worse for investor confidence than discretion-
ary power with no institutional safeguards to prevent arbitrary changes in policy. Credibility is
not established by decree. This point is applicable to all Latin American and Caribbean countries
and the political systems governing the region. Following Levy and Spiller, I agree that a regula-
tory framework introduced through presidential decrees is prone to great instability and hence
will not be credible.
Regulatory frameworks created by laws enacted by the elected legislative body are stronger
safeguards of stability than those formed by executive decrees. Presidential decrees or simple
decrees fail to convey credible signals to private investors. As Table 2 shows, most countries in
the region adopted specific laws to create the regulatory body in telecommunications. Others
(Argentina, Mexico and Peru) simply published presidential decrees.
Long-term contracts have been common in the water, sewerage, energy and telecommunica-
tions industries. Spiller and Sampson (1996) argue that long-term contracts are sometimes the
only way governments can credibly commit to not behave opportunistically and that regulation
by contract may be the only way to mitigate lack of government commitment. In their study of
Jamaican telecommunications history, they show that the highly discretionary power exerted by
the executive branch (the prime minister and the relevant minister) spurred government oppor-
tunism that, in turn, brought a steady underinvestment in the telecommunications sector by the
foreign operator. They also studied the Jamaican judiciary system, which has always been inde-
pendent and strong. Given a history of opportunism and the strength of the judiciary system in
Jamaica, the best design of the regulatory framework was regulation by contract.10
A main feature of the Levy and Spiller analysis is the idea that the design of the regulatory
framework should be compatible with a country’s institutional structure and its legal and admin-
istrative traditions. This suggests that regulatory governance can include two different uses of
long-term contracts: as a substitute for or complement to a separate regulatory institution (Stern
and Holder 1999). The first may be valid in the context of a single monopoly provider, as was
the case for telecommunications in Jamaica in 1987. However, that contract is currently subject
to hard renegotiations because it limited the ability of government to expand competition in the
sector and to reduce the too-high profit level of the C&W of Jamaica. Because technological
advances in telecommunications seem to be unlimited and concession contracts are inflexible, I
advocate using concession contracts as a complement to the separate regulatory framework.
10 Concession and license contracts have been common in Latin American ownership reforms. Countries like
Argentina, Venezuela, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Mexico signed such contracts, which stipulate the
obligations and rights of the operators and the pricing mechanism.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 15
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As Latin American countries have enacted new constitutions or amended old ones, a key
element has been an effort to strengthen and ensure greater independence of the judiciary
system.11 We should expect a stronger judiciary to be a mechanism for constraining executive or
legislative discretion; however, one should not underestimate the difficulties of implementing
laws and norms in Latin American countries.
4. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INDEX
As Latin America and the Caribbean have become more integrated into international
markets over the past decade, there has been a movement toward the creation and strengthening
of institutions. Structural reforms have also affected institutions. As state participation decreases,
the need for sound and fair institutions increases if private sectors are to expand investments.
And with growing urbanization, governments are pressured to create an institutional environ-
ment that allows more citizen participation in economic policy development.12
Gutiérrez and Berg (2000) based a first attempt to create a regulatory framework index
(RFI) for Latin American telecommunications on research by Galal and Nuriyal (1995). Look-
ing at telecom regulation in seven developing economies, Galal and Nauriyal stressed the
importance of factors like the level of autonomy and neutrality of the regulatory agency,
agency enforcement power and the existence of mechanisms for conflict resolution. Gutiérrez
and Berg constructed a dichotomous index, giving a score of 1 to a regulatory agency with at
least two of the three attributes, and zero otherwise. Although useful, the index had serious
shortcomings since it was based on secondary sources and involved a high degree of subjec-
tivity. Also, the dichotomous index reached the upper bound of 1 in one step, at which point
some might erroneously believe that countries had achieved complete regulatory develop-
ment in the telecommunications sector.
The later availability of work by ITU (1993) and Tenenbaum (1996) and more recent work by
Stern and Holder (1999) and Kennard (1999) led us to rethink the construction of the index,
particularly the problem of how to measure aspects like autonomy and accountability with less
subjectivity. To Tenenbaum’s four indicators for autonomy, we added two more features: the
regulatory body’s complete freedom in recruiting its own specialized staff (Estache and Martimort
1999), which involves exemption from civil service salary and recruitment rules to attract highly
trained personnel, and appointment of personnel for several years (Noll 1999).13
With regard to accountability, ITU (1993) stresses the importance of a right of appeal on
questions of regulatory process, although not on substantive policy issues. In addition to due
process, another factor is whether more than one body is responsible for regulatory policies.
Clarity of roles might include several factors, such as the right of the regulator to set a tariff for
basic services or impose fines and punishments. Transparency and participation are reflected in
11 For more details, see Gargarella (1997).
12 For more about this topic, see Burki and Perri (1998).
13 According to Petrazzini (1997, 365), “The process of building regulatory capabilities in developing countries
is proving to be one of the most difficult and elusive tasks of the reform. Acquiring the necessary funds,
hiring a diversified and highly professional staff, buffering…can be a slow and painstaking process.”16 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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public hearings held prior to decision-making and obligations to publish decisions in the media.
All these elements need to be clearly stated in the legal mandate.
Since I posit a developing regulatory framework for telecommunications in Latin America
from the beginning of the 1980s, I introduce as a first element the separation of operational and
regulatory activities as two different entities. This separation matters regardless of whether the
regulatory tasks were delegated to a government unit or an agency within the related ministry. I
call this the ITU/Kennard criterion.
I also incorporate the legal framework that created the regulatory body. As Levy and
Spiller note, a number of alternatives may be related to legal norms; for instance, laws voted by
the whole congress, presidential decrees and decrees issued by the related minister. I simplify the
problem to a matter of laws and decrees only.
Once the main criteria were identified and linked to concepts from the literature, I
operationalized them into the index. I reviewed journal articles, books, press releases, Internet
websites and, more importantly, the national legislation.14 Unfortunately, it was not possible to
collect reliable information for all the criteria from all twenty-four Latin American countries in
the sample. I gave the most weight to the information extracted from legislation (laws, decrees,
resolutions, etc.). Table 3 illustrates how the index was constructed. The dimensions suggested
by Stern and Holder are operationalized with the ITU/Tenenbaum criteria. The ITU/Kennard
criterion (separation of regulatory and operating activities) follows, along with Levy and Spiller’s
legal rank and an overall RFI estimate for one year.
TABLE 3
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INDEX (RFI)
14 An informal survey of regulators and industry managers was also considered.
  Autonomy 
(1) 
Clarity of Roles 
(2) 
Accountability 
(3)  ITU/K / 
Legal 
rank/τ   RFI 
Country  Funding*/ Removal*/ Prices*/ Fines*/  Appeal*/      . 
X  1 1  1  0  1  1  1   
NOTE: */ refers to ITU/Tenenbaum criteria;  / refers to ITU and Kennard criteria; τ / refers to the Levy and
Spiller criterion.
The further operationalization was to have a dichotomous procedure for every dimension.
So, for instance, if the country had a regulatory body with an independent source of financing,
I gave it a value of 1 (and zero otherwise). I then averaged the ITU/Tenenbaum criteria. In this
way, the average of all five attributes can reach a maximum of 1 and a minimum of zero. For the
ITU/Kennard criterion, I assigned a 1 if there was separation between the regulatory and oper-
ating activities, and zero otherwise. And for Levy and Spiller’s legal ranking, I gave a value of 1
for a law and 0.5 for any other kind of legislation backing up the regulatory body.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 17
Julio de 2002
The last operationalization was to give some weights to each of the three main overall dimen-
sions. There was some subjectivity in this, as I assigned the same weight to every dimension
(attribute) because information was available for only a few of the ITU/Tenenbaum criteria.
Each factor included for these dimensions has a weight of about 14.3 percent. In the future,
when more factors (and dimensions) are added, the weights should be varied accordingly. The
ITU/Kennard separation criteria and the Spiller’s legal rank also have the same weight.
The index has limitations. First, it tries to measure regulatory governance but not regulatory
incentives structure. In the United States, researchers15 take the regulatory framework as a given
and focus on the relationship between incentive regulation and telco performance, shedding
light on the ranking of price regulation, price caps, earnings share and rate-of-return regulation.
After all, the FCC and the state regulatory commissions have more than 60 years of experience.
My index is an attempt to characterize the regulatory framework and its development in telecom-
munications for selected Latin American countries.
Second, my index tries to capture the objective aspects that a sound regulatory framework
should have. Thus it reflects the letter of law but is silent about the law as applied. When I assign
a 1 to countries with legislation that says regulators cannot be freely removed, I am assuming that
this is accurate. However, day-to-day politics can deviate from legal theory, as the following
example from Bolivia illustrates.
Bolivia’s regulatory body has its own budget, and its members are selected by two-thirds of
the congress. It has authority to enforce relevant legislation and set tariffs. Its legal status was
conferred by congressional law. It appears an ideal model, but the following report from Pyra-
mid Research (1998, 145) reveals shortcomings. “Following controversy over the activities of the
first administration at the helm of the Superintendent regarding the awarding of concessions
that violated ENTEL’s monopoly, the Bolivian Congress voted in a new telecom regulatory
administration in October 1997 for a six-year term that will end in 2003. The fact that the
Bolivian Congress was able to remove the Superintendent because of a decision that threatened
ENTEL’s market share does not reflect positively on the autonomy and transparency of the
regulatory body. This signifies that the Congress’s decision had more weight than the law.”
In formulating the index, I did not attempt to correct for such instances by including the beliefs
of practitioners or experts about the performance of a regulatory body (as in, say, the various
rating systems for U.S. state regulatory agencies). The actual index would reflect only the letter of
the legislation and the day-to-day (year-to-year) evolution of regulatory tasks in the regulatory
authority. Nor did I include additional factors regarding autonomy, accountability and clarity of
roles, not to mention transparency and participation. With more factors, the index would be a
more comprehensive measure of changes in a country’s regulatory framework standing, but the
index value for most of the countries would go down. However, this work realistically can be done.
The index may involve mistakes of interpretation. This is a second-generation effort to con-
struct a useful index, and the research remains only a beginning step toward a more integrated
15 See the survey by Kridel et al. (1996) and Berg and Foreman (1996). A more detailed and thorough analysis of
incentive regulation in U.S. telecommunications is given in Sappington and Weissman (1996).18 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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and comparable approach to institutional reform in telecommunications. Availability of better
information will allow development of a better index in the future. Other research so far “pro-
vides interesting information about the overall effect of reform on several measures of perfor-
mance.… But to date, this work has not adopted a very comprehensive approach to characterize
the institutional and policy differences among reforming countries.… The main research agenda,
then, is to combine the richness of institutional detail that one finds in the best case studies with
a large enough statistical sample to support stronger conclusions about the direct links between
distinct policy decisions and ultimate performance. This task is not a small one” (Noll 1999, 59).
5. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INDEX AND RELATIONS
TO INSTITUTIONAL AND RISK INDEXES
The RFI measures regulatory governance in telecommunications for a sample of Latin
American countries.16 Exhibits 1-5 compare how the RFI correlates with other measures of
overall polity in Latin America, the GDP per capita and some measures of telecommunications
performance. I grouped the countries into quintiles for easy comparison (from lowest RFI scores
in bottom quintile to highest in the top).
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 show that the regulatory framework index is, in general, positively related
to higher levels of macro polity for the period 1990-97. This suggests that the micro-institutional
setting of a utility sector should develop in the same directions as the macro-institutional envi-
ronment (captured by Gastil and ICRG indexes). In particular it is worth mentioning the good
association of the RFI with the POLCON index showing that governance in telecommunica-
tions has moved in the same directions as the overall political constraints.
EXHIBIT 1




















































16 Gutierrez (2002) contains a more formal test of how the index helps explain performance variables in the
















Bottom 4th 3rd 2nd Top




















Bottom 4th 3rd 2nd Top










1990-199720 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
Borradores de investigación - No. 26
EXHIBIT 4
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However, as the exhibits show, some small divergence (positive or negative) between the two
institutional levels can occur.
Exhibit 4 presents the relation between the 1990-97 average of RFI and GDP per capita. All
in all, greater values on the RFI are associated with greater levels of GDP per capita (US$ 1995),
although some countries in a higher quintile are associated with lower levels of GDP per capita.
For example, some Central American countries stepped up their attempt to strengthen their
telecommunications regulatory bodies with statutes, while more wealthy Caribbean countries
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The last exhibit shows the association between the RFI and the level of teledensity (main
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) for the period 1990-97. Increasing teledensity is generally
associated with a stronger regulatory framework in telecommunications, but bear in mind that the
bottom quintile includes Uruguay (17.8 main lines per 100 people). Uruguay has one of the best
average rates of teledensity and generally good political and economic performance during the
period, yet it has not reformed its regulatory framework in telecommunications. Uruguay’s tele-LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 21
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communications’ incumbent is state-owned, there is no new legislation to integrate technological
development in the sector, and there was no competition at all during the period analyzed.
Table 4 presents averages of the RFI for different periods of time. Countries like Chile, the
Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago started well ahead of other countries, but progress
in strengthening their regulatory frameworks has been marginal. Chile was one of the first to
enact a modern telecommunications law and one of the first to privatize. Yet, with a stable
regulatory environment, competition in its telecommunications sector and a sound judiciary,
Chile still does not have a regulatory body with independent funding or fixed terms for commis-
sioners.17 The index has remained constant for Chile except during 1981-82.
TABLE 4
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INDEX FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
17 According to Bitran and Serra (1998, 948), Chile’s judicial authority does not always have the capacity to solve
conflicts involving intricate technical or economic issues and “a case study shows that the antitrust agencies
are reluctant to apply sanctions or adopt measures when the situations under study involve complex technical
problems”. A similar viewpoint can be found in the Pyramid Research (1998) study.
Country 1980-89 1991-97 
Argentina 0.34  0.72 
Barbados 0.48  0.48 
Belize 0.36  0.69 
Bolivia 0.34  0.50 
Brazil 0.34  0.53 
Chile 0.70  0.72 
Colombia 0.34  0.67 
Costa Rica  0.14  0.40 
Dominican Republic  0.62  0.63 
Ecuador 0.14  0.63 
El Salvador  0.14  0.25 
Guatemala 0.34  0.44 
Guyana 0.28  0.80 
Honduras 0.14  0.36 
Jamaica 0.48  0.66 
Mexico 0.34  0.49 
Nicaragua 0.14  0.34 
Panama 0.14  0.24 
Paraguay 0.14  0.36 
Peru 0.34  0.67 
Suriname 0.14  0.14 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.64  0.85 
Uruguay 0.24  0.37 
Venezuela 0.34  0.61 
Source: Author’s construction.22 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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The Dominican Republic is also interesting, given its long history with a service provider that is
a private monopoly. Its telecommunications reform has been oriented more toward opening the
market to competition and recently toward developing a more independent regulatory authority.
This is an example of a country that lacked an autonomous regulatory body but had a government
agency responsible for regulating telecommunications and relatively empowered to set tariffs and
fine operators in the sector. It therefore meets some of the ITU/Tenenbaum criteria.
 Some countries display a similar evolution in regulatory framework. The Central American
countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) are the latest to adopt
specific regulatory measures for public utilities. Some lacked even the ITU/Kennard criterion of
separation between operating and regulatory activities just three years ago but are now trying to
catch up to other countries in the region. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Perd have reached the
upper bound of the regulatory framework (Table 3), which means progress in the right direction
in terms of the institutional factors included in the index.
Table 5 shows a cross-country comparison of the RFI for different periods of time. As
noted, some countries started well ahead in their reform of the regulatory settings, but those
that have not furthered reform now lag behind the regional average. By the first half of the
1990s, the Andean countries began catching up, and for the last two years of the study, the larger
countries in the region, Brazil and Mexico, entered the group of countries with stronger regula-
tory framework in the telecommunications sector.
TABLE 5
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
  1985-90 1991-95 1996-97  1980-97 
Countries above 
Mean 
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6. CONCLUSION
Telecommunications reform across Latin America and the Caribbean has pushed privatization
more than in other regions of the world. After British Telecom in the United Kingdom privatized,
the first telecom operator in the western capitalist economies to do so, Latin American countries
followed suit. Chile’s initiatives served as an important model, but the way privatization took place
was different across countries and deserves further study and analysis.
The liberalization of the main telecom markets has been slow despite reform. Unfortu-
nately, at the time of privatization, governments across the region gave monopoly power to the
new owners, reducing the benefit of ownership reform. The exclusivity periods granted are
about to end in some countries, and open or partial competition will become possible. A by-
product of the concession of exclusivity periods has been the entrenchment of incumbents and
the appearance of anti-competitive behaviors.
The present index of the regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector (basic
services) uses the broad categories of autonomy, accountability, clarity of roles, and transpar-
ency and participation, the main features recommended by policy analysts and practitioners. To
operationalize an index, factors related to these categories were analyzed, such as independent
funding for the regulatory body, constraints on executive power to freely remove regulators, the
ability of the regulatory body to set tariffs and enforce norms. Consideration was also given to
the legal status of the norms that created the regulatory body. Most counties made an effort to
put the regulatory framework on a legal foundation, but a major shortcoming of the index is that
it reflects only the letter of the legislation. Because events and politics can circumvent the law,
the regulatory framework index needs to be extended to incorporate such factors. Nevertheless,
related research demonstrates both the feasibility and usefulness of the index.24 REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
(SOURCES GIVEN IN PARENTHESES AT END)
MLINES is main telephone lines. Each line represents a connection between a subscriber’s
terminal equipment and the public switched network, which has a dedicated port in the tele-
phone exchange equipment. Main lines per 100 inhabitants or teledensity is derived by taking
(Main Lines/Population) * 100. (See ITU 1997.)
GDPPC is the GDP per capita in 1990 U.S. dollars; TRADEGDP is the ratio (export plus
imports)/GDP (World Bank “Economic and Social Indicators 2000 CD-ROM”).
URBAN represents the degree of urbanization. It is derived by taking (urban population/
total population). (World Bank, “Economic and Social Indicators 2000 CD-ROM”).
The ICRG index is compiled by IRIS (Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal
Sector, University of Maryland) using information from a private international investment risk-
service company that employs experts to provide political and economic risk ratings of coun-
tries. I used the composite index made up of five components.
The GOVTYPE index was constructed with data provided by Jaggers and Gurr (1996). I
follow Londregan and Poole (1996) and combine the two measures of DEMOC and AUTOC
(democracy and autocracy) to construct GOVTYPE. S = DEMOC - AUTOC.
The Economic Freedom Index was constructed with data provided by the Economic Freedom
Network. The index is based on four major areas: (1) money and inflation, (2) structure of the
economy, (3) takings and discriminatory taxes, and (4) international trade. I use the simple overall
summary ratings. See Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000). The data reported in Table 1 is the
average between two years (i.e., 1985-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-1997). The index is available for
every five years starting in 1970 (1985, 1990, 1995 and 1997) at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/
publications/books/econ_free_2000/section_07.html.
INSTINV or Institutional Investor Index is the average of the country credit-rating index
that Institutional Investor magazine publishes twice a year (March and September). The index goes
on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 representing countries with the least chance of default. From 75
to 100 banks, each of which provides its own ratings, contribute to the index.
EUROMONEY is the average of the country risk-rating index that EUROMONEY maga-
zine publishes twice a year. The index also goes on a scale of 0 to 100. The index is composed of
nine categories, each with a different weighting. Economic performance and political risk ac-
count for 50% of the total index.
CELLSUB variable is the number of cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU 1997).
The Structural Policy Index covers 20 countries in the region from 1985 to 1995. The most
important feature of the index is that it reflects policy variables like tariffs, tax rates and so on,
and not results variables like ratio of exports to GDP and so on (IDB 1997).
The General Reform Index covers 17 countries in the region from 1970 to 1995 and is a joint
work of researchers in the ECLAC.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ 25
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POLCON is a index constructed by W. Henisz. As he mentions (Henisz and Zelner 2001, 132)
the index “was constructed to address the specific issue of concern to investors: the credibility of
the policy regime.” The index is available at http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/
POLCON/ContactInfo.html.
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